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This cross-sectional study was aimed at investigating the role of emotional regulation in regular gambling 
in a sample of 197 disordered and non-problem gamblers from Ecuador. Two proxies were used as measures 
of behavioral signs of generalized emotion dysregulation (UPPS-P emotion-driven impulsivity) and 
intentional emotion regulation strategies (ERQ), and their associations with gambling cognitions (as 
measured by the GRCS questionnaire), gambling behavior (SOGS), and comorbid alcohol and drug misuse 
(Multi-CAGE), were explored.  
For analyses, impulsivity traits, including emotion-driven impulsivity scores, were used as inputs 
to predict dispositional variables (ERQ strategies and GRCS cognitions), and clinically relevant behavioral 
outputs, while controlling for gambling severity. Hypotheses were based on previously published work, 
although the analysis has been improved (using hierarchical linear mixed-effects modelling), and 
homogenized in covariate control, and decision threshold stringency.  
 Results were as follows: (1) After controlling for relevant covariates, UPPS-P sensation seeking 
was positively associated with gambling cognitions, whereas positive urgency was positively associated 
with cognitive biases (interpretative bias, control illusion, and predictive control) but not with other 
gambling cognitions. (2) Among emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal, but not suppression, was 
associated with gambling cognitions. (3) Negative urgency was distinctively associated with suppression, 
but not with reappraisal. And (4), no impulsivity dimensions significantly predicted drug or alcohol misuse, 
although negative urgency fell just below the decision threshold. 
These results reinforce the importance of emotion regulation processes in the cognitive and 
behavioral manifestations of gambling. Most importantly, they suggest a dissociation between the role of 
model-free dysregulation of negative emotions (as measured by UPPS-P negative urgency), as a key 
contributor to gambling complication and general psychopathology; and the one of strategic emotion 
regulation, in fueling gambling-related cognitive distortions.  
 




Gambling Disorder (GD) is characterized by lack of control over gambling behavior in spite of negative, 
persistent and severe personal consequences. Recently, it has been re-conceptualized as a behavioral 
addiction, within the category of substance-related and addictive disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), which has somewhat contributed to reorient and unify its diagnosis and treatment 
(Stinchfield et al., 2016).  
Estimated prevalence of GD across studies in different countries approximates 3%, although 
figures can largely vary, depending on the methods and tools used (Stucki & Rihs-Middel, 2007). 
Prevalence, however, is probably increasing in some areas and population sectors, due to targeted exposure 
to gambling-related stimuli, and the variety and availability of new gambling options in the market 
(Hodgins, Stea, & Grant, 2011; Calado, Alexandre & Griffiths, 2017). Besides, data are particularly limited 
in some areas and domains (Nature, 2018). Studies in Latin-America, for instance, are scarce and 
unsystematic (Gowing et al., 2015), and, they are virtually inexistent in Ecuador, which is partly due to the 
prohibition of most forms of gambling in 2011. This particularity limits access to information about 
potentially problematic gamblers, as well as the availability of psychoeducation, counseling and treatment 
resources for potentially risky or pathological gamblers. At the same time, Ecuador has become an 
interesting context to study gambling in very idiosyncratic social and legal conditions. Hence, our main 
interest in the present study will be to explore individual differences in a sample of Ecuadorian disordered 
and non-disordered gamblers, and to test whether associations between personality traits, cognitive 
distortions, and clinically significant features mirror the ones previously described in countries where 
gambling is a legal and generalized leisure activity. 
A model to account for gamblers’ individual differences 
The DSM5 provides a unique diagnosis for GD, with three degrees of severity based on the number of 
diagnostic criteria met. Many authors have nonetheless stressed the importance of considering individual 
differences in its understanding (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002; MacLaren, Fugelsang, Harrigan, & Dixon, 
2011), in view of the fact that individual traits are strong predictors of preference for different gambling 
modalities (e.g. Navas et al., 2017b; Jiménez-Murcia et al., 2011), GD vulnerability and severity (e.g. 
Lussier, Derevensky, Gupta, Vitaro, 2014; Nower, Martins, Lin, & Blanco, 2013), and prognosis and 
response to treatment (Jara-Rizzo et al., 2018; Ramos-Grille, Gomà-i-Freixanet, Aragay, Valero, & Vallès, 
2015). The individual differences models from which these predictive traits are extracted are varied, with 
personality models (Ramos-Grille et al., 2015; Carlotta et al., 2015), impulsivity models (Maccallum, 
Blaszczynski, Ladouceur, & Nower, 2007; Savvidou et al., 2017), cognitive models (Toneatto, Blitz-Miller, 
Calderwood, Dragonetti, & Tsanos, 1997; van Holts, van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010), and 
neurobiological models (Clark et al., 2012, 2017; Potenza et al., 2013) being the most pervasive in literature. 
The Gambling Space Model (GSM) has been recently proposed to integrate these approaches to 
heterogeneity in gambling disorder (Navas, Billieux, Verdejo-García, & Perales, 2018). Inspired by the 
Pathways Model (Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), gambling addiction is modelled as mostly driven by 
instrumental and Pavlovian conditioning processes, linked to the reinforcement schedules present in 
gambling scenarios (Delfabbro, 2014). Beyond these, however, different psychobiology-informed, 
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affect/emotion-driven constructs play different roles in shaping GD vulnerability and development (see also 
Williams, Grisham, Erskine, & Cassedy, 2012; Maniaci, Picone, van Holst, Bolloni, Scardina, & Cannizaro, 
2017).  
In the GSM, gamblers are predicted to differ in four dimensions: (1) sensitivity to positive 
reinforcement, (2) and negative reinforcement components of gambling, (3) generalized emotion 
dysregulation, and (4) motivated cognitive elaboration and self-deception. The first dimension has been 
shown to play an important role in gambling preferences, motivation for change and a dropout risk during 
therapy (Aragay et al., 2015; Jara-Rizzo et al., 2018; Navas et al., 2017a), and the second one in transition 
from risky to pathological gambling, telescoping, and gambling severity (Ledgerwood & Petry, 2010; 
Ciccarelli, Griffiiths, Nigro & Cosenza, 2017; Zakiniaeiz, Cosgrove, Mazure, & Potenza 2017). These two 
dimensions are related to gambling motives, and thus to gambling as an overt coping/enhancing strategy. 
The third and fourth dimensions, however, have more to do with covert emotion regulation (Braunstein, 
Gross, & Oschner, 2017). Given that gambling motives can largely vary across contexts, this work focuses 
on the latter.  
Gambling and emotion regulation 
Generalized emotion dysregulation is regarded here as the failure to inhibit or control the intrusion of 
thoughts and expression of behaviors driven by strong emotions, and, particularly, negative ones (e.g. 
aggression). The GSM borrows the concept of negative urgency from the UPPS-P model of impulsivity 
(Lynam, Smith, Whiteside, & Cyders, 2007; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), and uses it as a proxy to measure 
the behavioral manifestation of a failure to effectively regulate intense negative emotions. Negative urgency 
has been reported to be one of the strongest indices of pathological status and complications among 
gamblers (Billieux et al., 2012). Converging studies have explored the neurobiological roots of negative 
urgency in basic emotion regulation processes (Chester et al., 2016; Ruiz de Lara, Navas, Soriano-Mas, 
Sescousse & Perales, 2018), and have shown that negative urgency plays a major role in an array of 
externalizing psychopathologies, including other addictions (Johnson, Carver, & Joorman, 2013; Johnson, 
Tharp, Peckham, Carver, & Haase, 2017). 
Motivated cognitive elaboration and self-deception includes cognitive biases by mean of which 
the gambler attempts to reduce the impact of negative consequences derived from gambling, or to justify 
and maintain their desire and motives for gambling. The Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS; Raylu 
& Oei, 2004), for example, evaluates five gambling-related cognitive domains. Inability to stop (e.g. “I’m 
not strong enough to stop gambling”) and gambling expectations (e.g. “Gambling makes things seem 
better”), refer to personal beliefs of lacking the ability or capacity to control gambling impulses, and 
overvaluing the joy, reward or relief that can be obtained from gambling, respectively. Illusion of control 
(e.g. “Praying helps me win”), predictive control (e.g. “When I have a win once, I will definitely win 
again”), and interpretative biases (e.g. “Relating my losses to bad luck and bad circumstances makes me 
continue gambling”) are distortions of reality involving causal attribution processes, and are categorized 
together, in a narrower sense, as gambling-related cognitive biases. 
Several models identify cognitive biases as a target of therapeutic approaches (Chrétien, Giroux, 
Goulet, Jacques, & Bouchard, 2017), and their biological bases are now subject to intense scrutiny (Clark, 
2017). The particularity of the GSM model regarding these cognitive distortions is formulating them as 
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resulting from elaborated emotion regulation mechanisms, in line with the motivated reasoning hypothesis 
(Kunda, 1990). At difference with model-free emotion dysregulation, these mechanisms are strategic, and 
their effective use requires some preservation of high-order cognition 
Aims and hypotheses 
The GSM provides a multidimensional space to characterize different gamblers’ profiles in the risky-
disordered range, and makes a number of specific, and sometimes counterintuitive predictions. The first 
one states that gambling-related cognitive biases (namely, illusion of control, predictive control, and 
interpretative biases) are more tightly related to emotion and motivation-driven aspects of impulsivity than 
to its cognitive facets. This prediction arises from conceptualizing cognitive biases themselves as resulting 
from strategies to enhance or to deal with the same positive and negative emotions that trigger impulsive 
behavior. This pattern of correlations was found in a large British sample (Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, 
Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark, 2011), and closely replicated in a Spanish one (Del Prete et al., 2017). 
The second prediction is more specific: if cognitive biases reflect a reinterpretation of gambling-
related events, or justifications of feelings and motives, they should be associated with the dispositional use 
of reappraisal-related strategies. However, reappraisal and related cognitive emotion regulation strategies 
have been customarily considered adaptive, wellbeing enhancing strategies (and thus related to better 
psychological health), in contrast with other less effective, costlier strategies (e.g. suppression), that have 
been related to poor psychological health (Gross & John, 2003; Potthoff et al., 2016). In line with this 
prediction, a recent study, by Navas et al. (2016) showed that a cluster of gambling disorder patients with 
stronger cognitive distortions were more prone to use the strategy putting in perspective (from the Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, CERQ, Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006) in daily life. Additionally, not only 
higher scores in GRCS, but also putting in perspective, and refocusing on planning (both of which are 
customarily considered adaptive strategies) were positively related to gambling severity.  
A third specific prediction arises from the GSM model and a related work by Navas et al. (2017b). 
As described above, negative urgency is considered a marker of malfunctioning of model-free emotion 
regulation mechanisms. Navas et al. found that GD patients with higher negative urgency scores show more 
intense activation of control-related prefrontal areas during a lab-based negative emotion regulation task, 
revealing that such patients experienced more cognitive load and needed to invest more executive resources 
to solve the task (see also Chester et al., 2016). In parallel, negative urgency correlated with more frequent 
use of emotion suppression (from the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, ERQ, Gross & John, 2003). This 
was interpreted as evidence that malfunctioning of basic emotion regulation mechanism generates some 
degree of overload upwards, and thus interferes the balanced use of strategic emotion regulation. Here, we 
intend to replicate such an association between negative urgency and dispositional use of suppression to 
regulate negative emotions. 
The fourth and last prediction also regards the overlapping between negative urgency and basic 
emotion dysregulation. In accordance with the abovementioned proposal that negative urgency underlies, 
not only GD, but also other disordered externalizing behaviors, we expect negative urgency to emerge as a 
complication marker, including an elevated risk of comorbidity with misuse of alcohol and other drugs. To 
our knowledge, this prediction remains untested. 
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  In summary, the GSM and previous evidence support the following associations regarding the role 
of emotion regulation in gambling: (1) Gambling-related cognitive biases are more tightly linked to affect 
and motivation-driven impulsivity than to cognitive impulsivity dimensions. (2) Gambling-related 
cognitive biases show associations with the use of elaborate emotion regulation strategies customarily 
regarded as adaptive and wellbeing-promoting. (3) Negative urgency reflects malfunctioning of basic 
regulation mechanisms, which breaks the balance between these and strategic emotion-regulation 
mechanism, thus altering the normal use of such strategies (and increasing the use of emotion suppression). 
And (4) negative urgency is associated with an elevated risk of GD comorbidity with other externalizing 
behaviors, including misuse of alcohol and other drugs. 
 So far, these associations have been observed in gamblers from countries where gambling is a 
legal leisure activity. The aims of the present study were, first, to directly replicate them, and thus test the 
soundness of the GSM, and second, to test them in a context in which sociocultural specificities plausibly 
have a large impact on the features and composition of gamblers’ population. The GSM is a psychobiology-
informed model. Social factors are expected to interact with the proposed neurocognitive mechanisms 
(particularly positive and negative reinforcement mechanisms), and thus to exploit some or other 
vulnerability paths, and increasing or decreasing the frequency of certain gambler profiles, but are not 
expected to change the basic set of relationships between constructs, or between those constructs and main 
clinical features. 
Methods 
Participants and procedure 
Community regular gamblers and patients undergoing treatment for gambling disorder and/or other 
addictions (mostly alcohol use disorder) at Centro de Recuperación Nueva Luz, and Centro de 
Recuperación Integral de Alcoholismo y Drogadicción (CRIAD), from Guayaquil, Ecuador, were 
contacted as potential participants. Non-patients were recruited by posting bills at the University of 
Guayaquil premises. All patients were receiving treatment for at least one addictive disorder, diagnosed by 
a clinical psychologist, on the basis of DSM-IV criteria. All potential participants were also briefly 
interviewed to check for inclusion criteria, namely being between 18 and 65 years old, not having suffered 
a head injury or neurologic problem, and not having been ever diagnosed with any psychiatric or 
psychologic disorder (apart from addictive disorders in the patient subgroup). Additionally, (a) patients 
were fully assessed only if they reported a previous history of significant problems as a consequence of 
gambling [as corroborated by a score larger than ≥ 4 in the South Oaks Gambling Screen questionnaire 
(SOGS, Spanish version; Echeburúa, Báez, Fernández-Montalvo, & Páez, 1994)], and (b) non-patients were 
fully assessed if they reported gambling at least twice a week. The final sample consisted of 27 patients 
from the rehabilitation centers and 170 community regular gamblers.  
The assessment consisted of a two-hour session. Some of the instruments were not relevant for the 
present purposes and will be reported elsewhere. All the assessments were carried out by an Ecuadorian 
Clinical Psychologist with a Master’s degree in neuroscience. The assessment protocol was divided in four 
blocks (cognitive tests, computer tests, emotion and personality tests, and a clinical interview). Block order, 
and task order within each block were counterbalanced.  
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Sociodemographic data and main measures’ scores for both subsamples are reported in Table 1. 
Instruments 
Gambling severity and other problematic behaviors  
The South Oaks gambling Screen (SOGS  ̧Lesieur & Blume, 1987) is customarily used to assess gambling 
severity, dependence, and debt accrual, and is the most common tool in international gambling research. 
Only the total severity score will be used in the present study. The Spanish version used in this study has 
shown good psychometric properties (Echeburúa et al., 1994) 
The MultiCAGE CAD-4 (Pedrero Pérez et al., 2007) is a screening tool used to detect self-
regulation problems in several behavioral domains (problem gambling, excessive spending/shopping, 
alcohol misuse, drug misuse, hypersexuality, excessive internet use, excessive videogaming, and 
dysregulated eating behavior). Each subscale consists of four yes/no items, checking for current cravings, 
others´ complaints about the potential problematic behavior, guilt or shame feelings and/or lack of self-
acknowledgment, and self-reported compensatory behaviors. Only the alcohol and illegal drug misuse 
subscales will be used here. Both have shown appropriate psychometric properties and predictive validity 
of alcohol and drug abuse. 
Impulsivity 
The Spanish version (Cándido, Orduña, Perales, Verdejo-García, & Billieux, 2012) of the UPPS-P 
impulsive behavior scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001) contains 20 items, and allows for a 5-dimension 
assessment of impulsivity: positive urgency (e.g. “I tend to lose control when I am in a great mood”), 
negative urgency (e.g. “When I am upset I often act without thinking”), (lack of) premeditation (e.g. “My 
thinking is usually careful and purposeful”), (lack of) perseverance (e.g. “Once I get going on something I 
hate to stop”), and sensation seeking (e.g. “I quite enjoy taking risks “). 
Gambling cognitions  
The Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS, Raylu & Oei, 2004) assesses five gambling-related 
cognitive domains: gambling expectancies (GE), illusion of control (IC), predictive control (PC), inability 
to stop gambling (ISG), and interpretative bias (IB). Its Spanish version has been recently validated by Del 
Prete et al. (2017), showing Cronbach’s α values of 0.741, 0.713, 0.836, 0.896, and 0.859 for the 
abovementioned dimensions, respectively. Patients in our sample were instructed to answer the 
questionnaire with regard to the time when they used to gamble (prior to therapy onset), whereas 
recreational gamblers were asked to answer the questionnaire in relation to the present time.  
Emotion regulation strategies 
The Spanish version (ERQ, Cabello, Salguero, Fernández-Berrocal, & Gross, 2013) of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) was used to assess the dispositional use of two emotion 
regulation strategies: reappraisal and emotional suppression. This questionnaire has shown adequate 
validity and internal consistency (Cronbach’s α =0.75, 0.71, respectively). 
Statistical analyses and results 
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The database and R Code for main analysis, as well as the JASP file containing complementary analyses 
(as described in the Appendix, Supplemental materials) are available without restriction at 
http://osf.io/zy9k8 
Correlations 
Correlations regarding the questionnaires involved in our main hypothesis, along with correlations of all 
traits with SOGS gambling severity, are displayed in Table 2. Shaded areas include correlations that were 
predicted to be significant according to our hypotheses, namely (a) correlations of affect and motivation-
driven UPPS-P impulsivity dimensions with GRCS gambling cognitions (15-member family), (b) 
correlations between ERQ reappraisal and gambling cognitions (5-member family), (c) the single 
correlation between UPPS-P negative urgency and ERQ suppression, and (d) correlations between UPPS-
P negative urgency and MultiCAGE alcohol and drugs subscales (2-member family). Correlations yielding 
significant two-tailed p-values, after family-wise Bonferroni correction are marked with an asterisk in the 
Table. All these correlations were also submitted to a network analysis; however, given this analysis is 
mostly redundant with main analysis, it is reported in the Appendix (Supplemental materials). 
 Importantly, these correlations are also likely to be explained away, not only by differences in 
severity among gamblers, but also by sociodemographic confounders. In the subsequent set of analyses, we 
test whether target relationships survive after controlling for relevant covariates. 
Impulsivity (UPPS-P) – gambling cognitions (GRCS) 
This analysis was aimed at testing the relationship between impulsivity scores (as measured by the five 
dimensions of the UPPS-P questionnaire) and gambling-related cognitions (as measured by the GRCS 
questionnaire), with UPPS-P scores as input variable, and GRCS scores as output variable, while 
controlling for potential confounders. All quantitative variables were translated into a zero-centered scale 
before any further analyses.  
A baseline linear mixed-effects (LME) model was built with participant as a random intercept, 
SOGS score and SOGS x GRCS subscale (ISG, IC, PC, GE, and IB) as fixed effects, and GRCS scores in 
the five subscales as dependent measures (the differences between GRCS subscales were previously 
eliminated by centering). Confounders (age, monthly income, education years, and gender) were 
simultaneously added upon the baseline model, but kept only if they significantly improved model fit. In 
order to do so, the baseline + all confounders model was tested against the same model without each of the 
confounders (backward test). The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and a likelihood ratio test were 
simultaneously used to make a decision on model fit. The all-confounders model lost fit only when 
education years was removed (AIC = 3.704, L.Ratio = 5.704, p = 0.017), so education years was kept, and 
age and gender were removed. The same logic was followed with confounders x GRCS subscale 
interactions (i.e. differential effects of confounders across subscales), but none of them substantially 
contributed to model fit. In consequence, the baseline + confounders model was composed of participant 
as the only random effect, and SOGS, SOGS x GRCS subscale, and education years as fixed effects. 
To test the effects of UPPS-P variables on GRCS measures, a similar, yet more stringent, 
hierarchical method was followed. The effect of each UPPS-P dimension effect was kept if (1) removing it 
from a model with all UPPS-P dimensions hampered model fit (backward test), and (2) adding it to the 
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baseline + confounders model improved model fit (forward test). Positive urgency passed the forward 
(AIC = 6.957, L.Ratio = 8.957, p < 0.028), and the backward (AIC = 1.936, L.Ratio = 3.936, p = 0.047) 
tests, and so did sensation seeking (AIC = 9.739, L.Ratio = 11.739, p < 0.001; AIC = 4.256, L.Ratio = 
6.256, p < 0.012, for the forward and the backward test, respectively). These results suggest that gamblers 
with higher scores in those two UPPS-P dimensions also showed higher general GRCS scores, 
independently of gambling severity and potential confounders.  
UPPS-P x GRCS subscale interactive effects (that is, the potential differential effect of UPPS-P 
dimensions across GRCS domains) were tested following the same hierarchical rationale, against the model 
resulting from the previous step. Only the positive urgency x GRCS measure interaction passed both the 
forward and backward tests (AIC = 7.708, L.Ratio = 15.707, p = 0.003; AIC = 7.035, L.Ratio = 15.035, 
p = 0.005), indicating that the effect of positive urgency varied across GRCS domains. 
In summary, the best-fitting model contained the effects of positive urgency, R2 = 0.018 [CI90% 
0 – 0.072; non-significant after including the interaction, t(192) = -0.409, p = 0.683], sensation seeking, R2 
= 0.031 [CI90% 0.02 – 0.096], and the positive urgency x GRCS subscale interaction, R2 = 0.020 [CI90% 
0.08 – 0.048]. The interactive effect was thus followed with GRCS subscale-by-subscale regression 
analyses, with UPPS-P dimensions as predictors, and SOGS severity and education as potential 
confounders. This set of analyses yielded significant effects of positive urgency on illusion of control [ = 
0.188, t(189) = 2.576, p = 0.011], predictive control [ = 0.188, t(189) = 2.385, p = 0.018], and interpretative 
bias [ = 0.140, t(189) = 2.037, p = 0.043]. In other words, the positive urgency x GRCS subscale interaction 
seemed to originate in the fact that positive urgency was associated to cognitive biases, but not to gambling 
expectancies or perceived inability to stop gambling.  
Emotion regulation (ERQ) – gambling cognitions (GRCS) 
An identical rationale was followed to test the relationships between emotion regulation strategies (ERQ 
suppression and reappraisal) and GRCS gambling cognitions, starting with the same baseline + confounders 
model.  
In this case, only the reappraisal score passed both the forward and the backward tests (AIC = 
14.208, L.Ratio = 16.208, p < 0.001, and AIC = 9.717, L.Ratio = 11.717, p < 0.001, respectively), with 
reappraisal correlating globally and positively with the intensity of gambling cognitions. Neither the 
reappraisal x GRCS subscale term, nor the suppression x GRCS subscale term contributed to improving 
model fit, so the effect of reappraisal must be considered generalized across the five GRCS gambling 
cognitions, with a size R2 = 0.079 [CI90% 0.022 – 0.163]. 
Impulsivity (UPPS-P) – Emotion regulation (ERQ) 
In this case, UPPS-P scores were used to predict ERQ dispositional use of suppression and reappraisal to 
control negative emotions in daily life. The analysis rationale was as described in previous sections. 
However, in all models fitted with nlme, residuals remained non-independent from fitted values. In order 
to surpass that problem, standardized suppression and reappraisal scores were separately discretized in 7 
bins with approximately the same number of observations (using the cut2 function in the Hmisc R package; 
Farrell, 2018), and treated as ordinal variables. Discretization in 7 bins was used to keep the scoring as 
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informative as possible, while maintaining a sufficient number of observations per bin. Cumulative-link 
linear mixed-effects modeling (CLME), with a logit link function (as implemented in the ordinal package 
in R; Bojesen Christensen, 2015) was used in place of LME. In all other senses, the model construction and 
selection criteria remained as described above (please note that, although discretization improved the final 
model, it did not affect the basic pattern of results). 
A baseline CLME model was built with participant as random intercept, SOGS score and SOGS 
x ERQ subscale (reappraisal, suppression) as fixed factors, and ERQ scores in two subscales as dependent 
measures. The baseline + all confounders model lost fit when age (AIC = 4.730, L.Ratio = 6.730, p = 
0.009) and education years (AIC = 5.058, L.Ratio = 7.058, p = 0.008) were removed, so these two factors 
were kept. No UPPS-P x ERQ subscale interactive effect contributed to model fit. The definitive baseline 
+ confounders model was composed of participant as a random intercept, and SOGS, SOGS x ERQ 
dimension, age and education years as fixed terms. Subsequent models were tested against this one. 
No UPPS-P dimensions contributed to model fit. However, the negative urgency x ERQ subscale 
interaction passed both the forward and the backward tests (AIC = 4.280, L.Ratio = 8.280, p = 0.016, and 
AIC = 4.996, L.Ratio = 8.996, p = 0.011, respectively). 
This effect was thus followed with ERQ subscale-by-subscale CLM analyses, with SOGS, SOGS 
x ERQ dimension, age and education years as confounders, and UPPS-P scores as main predictors. In 
accordance with the global analysis, these analyses yielded a significant effect of negative urgency, 
restricted to the ERQ suppression subscale [z = 2.132, p = 0.033], with higher negative urgency scores 
signaling a more frequent dispositional use of suppression to control negative emotions. 
Impulsivity – Drug and alcohol risk of misuse 
Finally, we assessed the relationship between UPPS-P scores and risk of alcohol and illegal drugs misuse, 
as measured by the drug and alcohol subscales of the MultiCAGE. These scores range from 0 to 4, and 
were fitted as ordinal scores with the ordinal package (logit link). 
A baseline model was built with participant as random intercept, SOGS score, MultiCAGE 
subscale (alcohol, drugs), and the SOGS x MultiCAGE subscale interaction as fixed terms, and MultiCAGE 
scores in two subscales as dependent measures. Given that raw MultiCAGE scores are ordinal in their 
original form, standardization was not feasible, and the MultiCAGE subscale effect was thus included in 
the baseline model. The baseline + all confounders model lost fit when education years (AIC = 4.214, 
L.Ratio = 6.214, p = 0.013), monthly income (AIC = 4.835, L.Ratio = 6.835, p = 0.009), and sex (AIC = 
7.288, L.Ratio = 9.288, p = 0.002) were removed, so these three factors were kept. The age x MultiCAGE 
subdimension (AIC = 6.561, L.Ratio = 10.561, p = 0.005), the education years x subdimension (AIC = 
2.747, L.Ratio = 4.747, p = 0.029), and the monthly income x subdimension (AIC = 2.955, L.Ratio = 
4.955, p = 0.026) interactions contributed to model fit, and were also kept. Subsequent models were tested 
against this baseline + confounders + interactions model. 
No UPPS-P dimensions simultaneously passed the forward and backward tests. Still, negative 
urgency passed the forward test (AIC = 3.349, L.Ratio = 5.349, p = 0.021), and fell close to passing the 
backward test (AIC = 1.540, L.Ratio = 3.535, p = 0.060; z = 1.852 in the saturated model).  




This study was aimed at testing the set of associations regarding the role of emotional regulation in 
gamblers’ individual differences predicted by the Gambling Space Model (GSM), in the particular 
sociocultural context of a country where gambling is mostly illegal (i.e. Ecuador). With that aim in mind, 
we explored the associations between gambling cognitions (as measured by the GRCS), impulsivity (UPPS-
P), emotion regulation strategies (ERQ), and comorbid alcohol and drug misuse (Multi-CAGE CAD4). For 
analyses, personality (impulsivity) scores were used as inputs to predict dispositional variables (ERQ and 
GRCS scores), and symptoms (MultiCAGE drugs and alcohol subscales). All hypotheses were based on 
previous works, although the analysis strategy has been improved and homogenized in terms of sample size 
and composition, covariate control, and decision threshold stringency.  
 Results can be summarized as follows: (1) after controlling for gambling severity and relevant 
sociodemographic covariates, sensation seeking was positively associated with gambling cognitions, 
whereas positive urgency was positively associated with cognitive biases, defined in a narrow sense 
(interpretative bias, illusion of control, and predictive control) but not with other gambling cognitions 
(inability to stop and gambling expectancies). On the contrary, negative urgency was far from predicting 
any gambling cognitions. (2) Among emotion regulation strategies, reappraisal, but not suppression, was 
associated with gambling cognitions. (3) Negative urgency was distinctively associated with suppression, 
but not with reappraisal. And (4), no impulsivity dimensions substantially predicted comorbid drug and 
alcohol abuse, although negative urgency fell just below the decision threshold. These links were confirmed 
by a network analysis, as shown in the appendix (Supplemental materials). 
Jointly considered, these results reinforce the importance of emotion regulation processes in the 
cognitive and behavioral manifestations of gambling (Williams et al., 2012). Beyond that overarching 
corroboration, the first set of specific relationships confirms the affective nature of cognitive biases 
predicted by the cognitive elaboration and self-deception construct in the GSM model, and also partially 
replicates previous findings by Michalczuk et al. (2011) and Del Prete et al. (2017). However, these studies 
did not seggregate the effect of impulsivity from gambling severity and sociodemographic factors. In line 
with that, unconditional correlations between negative urgency and gambling cognitions were explained 
away by covariate control in further analyses. This negative finding thus qualifies our initial prediction 
about the potential link between gambling cognitions and motivation/affect driven impulsivity (which did 
not include any reference to possible differential influences of positve and negative affect/motives). 
As noted in the introduction, the hypothesis that affect/motivation driven impulsivity is associated 
with cognitive biases was founded on the assumption that problem gamblers distort reality in an attempt to 
reduce the impact of negative consequences derived from gambling, or to justify and maintain their desire 
and positive motives for gambling. In other words, we assumed that cognitive biases would be equally 
fueled by enhancement regulation and coping regulation. Our data support the former possibility but 
certainly not the latter.  
Results are more consistent with predictions regarding the linkage between emotion regulation 
strategies and cognitive biases. Extending Navas et al.’s (2016) findings, reappraisal was positively 
associated with gambling cognitions. This association not only corroborates the emotional roots of 
gambling cognitions, but also their overlap with high-order, model-based emotion regulation strategies. 
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These strategies are customarily regarded as adaptive and have been linked to psychological adjustment 
and wellbeing (Aldao et al., 2010; Gross & John, 2003). Somewhat counterintuitively, these strategies seem 
to help gamblers deceive themselves, get an imaginary sense of mastery and justify their desire for 
gambling. Tentatively, enhancement of positive emotional states elicited by gambling episodes could bias 
the processing of gambling outcomes, altering associative and causal attribution learning, and thereby 
increasing the strength of gambling distorted beliefs (Navas, 2016).  
The last two sets of hypothesized associations have implications beyond gambling 
symptomatology. The fact that negative urgency signals the dispositional use of suppression to regulate 
negative emotions (and, actually, seem to alter the balance between reappraisal and suppression) suggests 
that negative urgency is a marker of gambling ‘over-pathologization’, that is, a clue that psychopathology 
extends beyond gambling, to other potentially problematic behaviors. This possibility emerges from the 
extensive available evidence of a link between suppression use and a variety of mental disorders (Wegner 
& Zanakos, 1994). However, our attempt to further corroborate this idea by finding an association between 
negative urgency and comorbid alcohol and drug misuse found only a suggestive and partial corroboration. 
Limitations and strengths 
These results must be interpreted in light of at least two limitations. First, effects are mostly subtle (mostly 
falling in the high end of the small size range [R2 = 0.01 – R2 = 0.10], or the low end of the medium size 
range [R2 = 0.1 – R2 = 0.25], according to customary conventions. This is partially attributable to the 
measurement error consubstantial to the scales used here, and also to the fact that some of them (e.g. 
negative urgency) were used as proxies to the key construct of interest (e.g. generalized emotion regulation 
failure). Further research is needed to find more direct ways to measure such constructs. Second, 
associations do not allow to establish causal directionality. Input and output variables in analyses were 
established on the basis of which of them were more basic traits (with personality traits considered more 
fundamental than dispositional or behavioral traits). Results reinforce the GSM because hypotheses 
emerged from it, but, definitely, other underlying structures are viable.  
 At the same time, this work also presents three remarkable strengths. First, its large sample size 
compared with studies of the same sort. Second, the sensitivity of statistical analyses, combined with a 
stringent criterion on model fit, designed to avoid false positives. And finally, its purely confirmatory 
nature, with all hypotheses emerging from previous works and GSM predictions. 
Final remarks 
Emotion regulation has a key role in many mental disorders. Very powerful models describing the different 
components of emotion regulation are also available in the recent literature. The proposal that different 
emotion regulation mechanisms differ in the degree of involvement of model-free vs. model-based 
processes (Etkin, Büchel & Gross, 2015) is particularly appealing, and seems to fit well with the different 
ways and levels of severity in which gambling disorder manifests in different patient profiles. Our results 
suggest different roles for the generalized emotion regulation failure (as measured by negative urgency), 
and the motivated use of reappraisal (customarily regarded as adaptive). The former seems to be 
characteristic of a complicated profile (probably overlapping with the impulsive-antisocial gambler subtype 
described by the pathways model, Blaszczynski & Nower, 2002), with heightened psychopathology and 
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worse prognosis. The latter seems however characteristic of overconfident, sophisticated gamblers, 
probably with well-preserved cognitive and intellectual abilities, but with complex networks of beliefs that 
help them maintain gambling motivation. We suspect this profile is associated with new gambling 
modalities, and more pervasive in young gamblers, and will probably be on the rise in the years to come 
(Gainsbury, Russell, Hing, Wood, Lubman, & Blaszczynski, 2015; Griffiths, Wardle, Orford, Sproston, & 
Erens, 2009).  
 Importantly, the context of the sample from which these data have been collected is very different 
to the British and Spanish samples of the studies from which hypotheses generated. In spite of the 
differences, results seem mostly analogue. Similarities are compatible with a cross-culturally valid and 
unique definition of gambling disorder, and also with the commonality of its basic neurocognitive 
mechanisms. The GSM is however sensitive to the interactions between those basic mechanisms and 
gambling exposure, which make us suspect that the same mechanisms could give rise to quite different 
proportions of the different gambler profiles across different cultural contexts, depending on factors like 




All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical 
standards of the institutional and/or national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration 
and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. 
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Table 1 Sociodemographic data and scores in target measures from community gamblers and patients 
Community gamblers Patients 
 
Sociodemographic variables   
Sex 39% females 26% females 
Age  34.36 (13.73)  25.74 (8.34) 
Years of education  13.20 (4.02) 12.52 (2.33) 
ERQ     
Reap 30.41 (7.65) 29.81 (9.06) 
Supp 17.47 (6.58) 15.89 (7.08) 
SOGS     
Severity 3.60 (3.55) 7.78 (4.54) 
MC     
Alcohol  0.35 (0.35) 0.64 (0.33) 
Drugs 0.08 (0.20) 0.77 (0.25) 
UPPS-P     
NegUrg 2.49 (0.78) 2.73 (0.84) 
PosUrg 2.51 (0.71) 2.79 (0.58) 
SensSeek 2.66 (0.89) 2.97 (0.76) 
Lprem 1.75 (0.63) 1.89 (0.64) 
Lpers 1.76 (0.62) 1.92 (0.63) 
GRCS     
GE 3.83 (1.60) 3.56 (1.95) 
CI 2.36 (1.47) 3.09 (1.69) 
PC 3.17 (1.50) 3.90 (1.75) 
ISG 2.13 (1.34) 2.93 (1.68) 
IB 3.04 (1.80) 3.83 (2.08) 
Note: ERQ: emotion regulation questionnaire (Reap: reappraisal; Supp: 
suppression); SOGS: South Oaks gambling screen; MC: MultiCAGE 
CAD-4; UPPS-P: NegUrg: negative urgency; PosUrg: positive urgency; 
SensSeek: sensation seeking, Lprem: Lack of premeditation; Lpers: Lack 
of perseverance; GRCS: gambling-related cognitive scale (GE: gambling 
expectancies; CI: control illusion; PC: predictive control; ISG: inability to 
stop gambling; IB: interpretative bias).  
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Table 2 Correlations between variables  
 GRCS           ERQ     MC     SOGS 
 GE CI PC ISG IB  Reap. Sup.  Alcohol Drugs  Severity 
UPPS-P                           
Neg. U 0.10 0.21* 0.18 0.09 0.15  -0.05 0.16*  0.22* 0.12  0.23* 
Pos. U 0.04 0.26* 0.23* 0.16 0.20  -0.06 0.00  0.15 0.05  0.12 
SS 0.21* 0.24* 0.21* 0.23* 0.24*  -0.02 0.05  0.07 0.01  0.16 
Lprem -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.01  -0.09 -0.05  0.15 0.05  0.20* 
Lpers -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.02 0.02  -0.05 -0.04  0.22 0.12  0.23*               
 
GRCS                           
GE       0.30* 0.23     0.30* 
CI       0.27* 0.23     0.37* 
PC       0.23* 0.21     0.39* 
ISG       0.22* 0.12     0.51* 
IB       0.24* 0.18     0.47*               
 
MC       
  
                  
Alcohol             0.48* 
Drugs                       0.37* 
Note: GRCS: gambling-related cognitive scale (GE: gambling expectancies; CI: control illusion; PC: predictive 
control; ISG: inability to stop gambling; IB: interpretative bias); ERQ: emotion regulation questionnaire (Reap.: 
reappraisal; Sup.: suppression); MC: MultiCAGE CAD-4; SOGS: South Oaks gambling screen; Neg.U: negative 
urgency; Pos.U: positive urgency; SS: sensation seeking, Lprem: Lack of premeditation; Lpers: Lack of perseverance. 
* Correlations yielding significant two-tailed p-values, after family-wise Bonferroni correction. 
 
 
